Abstract-Secrecy capacity of a multiple-antenna wiretap channel is studied in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Expressions for the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 are derived. Transmission strategies required to achieve these derivatives are identified. In particular, it is shown that it is optimal in the low-SNR regime to transmit in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of
I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECURE transmission of confidential messages is a critical issue in communication systems and especially in wireless systems due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions. In [1] , Wyner addressed the transmission security from an information-theoretic point of view, and identified the rateequivocation region and established the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel in which the wiretapper receives a degraded version of the signal observed by the legitimate receiver. The secrecy capacity is defined as the supremum of the reliable communication rates from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver, which can be achieved while keeping the rate at which the eavesdropper gathers information about the messages negligible. Later, these results are extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel in [2] . In [3] , Csiszár and Körner considered a more general wiretap channel model and established the secrecy capacity when the transmitter has a common message for two receivers and a confidential message to only one. Recently, there has been a flurry of activity in the area of information-theoretic security, where, for instance, the impact of fading, cooperation, and interference on secrecy are studied (see e.g., [4] and the articles and references therein). Several recent results also addressed the secrecy capacity when multiple-antennas are employed by the transmitter, receiver, and the eavesdropper [5] - [9] . The secrecy capacity for the most general case in which arbitrary number of antennas are present at each terminal has been established in [8] and [9] . In addition to security issues, another pivotal concern in most wireless systems is energy-efficient operation especially when wireless units are powered by batteries. From an information-theoretic perspective, energy efficiency can be measured by the energy required to send one information bit reliably. It is well-known that for unfaded and fading Gaussian channels subject to average input power constraints, energy efficiency improves as one operates at lower SNR levels, and the minimum bit energy is achieved as SNR vanishes [11] . Hence, requirements on energy efficiency necessitate operation in the low-SNR regime. Additionally, operating at low SNR levels has its benefits in terms of limiting the interference.
In this paper, in order to address the two critical issues of security and energy-efficiency jointly, we study the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. It is worthwhile to note that operation at low SNRs, in addition to improving the energy efficiency, is beneficial from a security perspective as well. In the low-SNR regime, either the transmission power is small or the bandwidth is large. In either case, we have low probability of intercept as it is generally difficult for an eavesdropper to detect the signals in this regime.
We consider a general multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) channel model and identify the optimal transmission strategies in the low-SNR regime under secrecy constraints. Since secrecy capacity is in general smaller than the capacity attained in the absence of confidentiality concerns, energy per bit requirements increase due to security constraints. In this work, we quantify these increased energy costs and address the tradeoff between secrecy and energy efficiency. It should also be noted that since practical codes for the MIMO wiretap channel have not been identified yet, the results presented in this paper represent the ultimate limits and are mostly of theoretical interest. Our goals are to establish the fundamental benchmarks with which the performance of practical systems can be compared, and also to obtain design guidelines for energy-efficient and secure communication. The main contributions of the paper are listed below: 1) We determine the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0, and provide a secondorder approximation to the MIMO secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. Through this analysis, we quantify the impact of secrecy constraints on the performance. 2) We identify the optimal transmission strategies in the low-SNR regime. In particular, we determine that transmission in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of a certain matrix that depends on the channel matrices is second-order optimal. In the case in which the maximum 0090-6778/12$31.00 c 2012 IEEE eigenvalue has multiplicity one, beamforming is shown to be optimal. 3) We find the minimum energy required to send one bit both reliably and securely. We characterize the tradeoff between energy efficiency and secrecy. 4) We investigate the impact of fading by studying the low-SNR secrecy capacity in fading scenarios. We show that in general both independent and correlated fading improve the energy efficiency. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the channel model. In Section III, we study the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime and determine the minimum energy per secret bit. We investigate the impact of fading in Section IV and provide conclusions in Section V. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a MIMO channel model and assume that the transmitter, legitimate receiver, and eavesdropper are equipped with n T , n R , and n E antennas, respectively. We further assume that the channel input-output relations between the transmitter and legitimate receiver, and the transmitter and eavesdropper are given by y m = H m x + n m and y e = H e x + n e ,
respectively. Above, x denotes the n T × 1-dimensional transmitted signal vector. This channel input is subject to the following average power constraint:
where tr denotes the trace operation and K x = E{xx † } is the covariance matrix of the input. In (1), n R ×1-dimensional y m and n E × 1-dimensional y e represent the received signal vectors at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. Moreover, n m with dimension n R × 1 and n e with dimension n E × 1 are independent, zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with E{n m n † m } = N m I and E{n e n † e } = N e I, where I is the identity matrix. The signal-to-noise ratio is defined as
Finally, in the channel models, H m is the n R × n Tdimensional channel matrix between the transmitter and legitimate receiver, and H e is the n E × n T -dimensional channel matrix between the transmitter and eavesdropper. While being fixed deterministic matrices in unfaded channels, H m and H e in fading channels are random matrices whose components denote the fading coefficients between the corresponding antennas at the transmitting and receiving ends. In order to ensure that the ergodic secrecy capacity expressions have operational significance in fading scenarios, we assume that the fading coefficients are stationary and ergodic as in [13] . Moreover, we assume throughout the paper that the channel matrices H m and H e are perfectly known by all parties.
III. SECRECY IN THE LOW-SNR REGIME
Recently, in [8] and [9] , it has been shown that when the channel matrices H m and H e are fixed for the entire transmission period and are known to all three terminals 1 , then the secrecy capacity in nats/s/Hz/receive-dimension is given by 2 3 
where the maximization is over all possible input covariance matrices K x 0 4 subject to a trace constraint. We note that since log det I + 1/N m H m K x H † m is a concave function of K x , the objective function in (4) is in general neither concave nor convex in K x , making the identification the optimal input covariance matrix a difficult task for arbitrary SNR levels.
In this paper, we concentrate on the low-SNR regime. In this regime, the behavior of the secrecy capacity can be accurately predicted by its first and second derivatives with respect to SNR at SNR = 0:
Moreover,Ċ s (0) andC s (0) also enable us to analyze the energy efficiency in the low-SNR regime through the following notions [11] :
where
denotes the minimum bit energy required for reliable communication under secrecy constraints (or equivalently minimum energy per secret bit), and S 0 denotes the wideband slope which is the slope of the secrecy capacity in bits/dimension/(3 dB) at the point
. These quantities provide a linear approximation of the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. While
is a performance measure for vanishing SNR, S 0 together with
characterize the performance at low but nonzero SNRs. We note that the formula for the minimum bit energy is valid if C s is a concave function of SNR, which we show later in the paper.
A. First and Second Derivatives of the Secrecy Capacity
Before analyzing the secrecy capacity, we first consider the secrecy rate expression given by
The assumption of perfect channel knowledge can, for instance, be justified in scenarios in which a base station, which knows the channels of the users, attempt to transmit confidential messages to a user and hence treat the other users as eavesdroppers. 2 Unless stated otherwise, all logarithms throughout the paper are to the base e. 3 Normalization of the secrecy capacity with the number of receive antennas n R is done in order to be able to express the energy per secret bit as the ratio of SNR to Cs(SNR) in (31) in Section III-B. Note that the signal energy in the SNR expression in (3) is also normalized with n R . 4 and denote positive semidefinite and positive definite partial orderings, respectively, for Hermitian matrices. If A B, then A−B is a positive semidefinite matrix. Similarly, A B implies that A−B is positive definite.
where [x] + denotes the positive part of x. Hence, [x] + = x for x > 0 and zero otherwise. Note that secrecy rate in (7) provides the rate of secure communication achieved with a given arbitrary input covariance matrix K x with tr (K x ) ≤ P . The following result characterizes the first and second derivatives of the secrecy rate at SNR = 0.
Proposition 1: For a given input covariance matrix K x , the first derivative of the secrecy rate in (7) with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 iṡ
P K x is the normalized input covariance matrix, and Φ is defined as
The second derivative of the secrecy rate at SNR = 0 is given bÿ
Proof : See Appendix A. The first derivative of the secrecy rate in Proposition 1 can also be easily obtained from the following first-order expansion of the mutual information (around K x = 0) provided in [12, Equation (40)]
is the Frobenius norm of the matrix K x . Applying this expansion to the secrecy rate in (7), we have
Assuming, without loss of generality, that the nonzero eigenvalues of K x scale linearly with P , we can obtain from (13) the following expansion
confirming the first derivative result in Proposition 1. Note that the secrecy capacity can be expressed as the secrecy rate maximized over the input covariance matrices. Then, using the above expansion, we can write
= max
Kx 0 tr ( Kx)≤1İ
P K x is again the normalized input covariance matrix which needs to satisfy tr ( K x ) ≤ 1. From (17), we see thatĊ s (0) = max Kx 0
over all positive semidefinite Hermitian matrices satisfying tr ( K x ) ≤ 1 leads us to the first derivative of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0. Employing this approach and identifying the optimal input covariance structure, which is required to also achieve the second derivative, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1: The first derivative of the secrecy capacity in (4) with respect to SNR at SNR = 0 is
e H e .Ċ s (0) can be achieved by choosing the input covariance matrix as K x = P uu † where P denotes the average power and u is the normalized eigenvector that corresponds to λ max (Φ).
Moreover, the second derivative of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is given by (19) on the next page, where l is the multiplicity of λ max (Φ) > 0, {u i } are the eigenvectors that span the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of Φ, and
The second derivative is achieved by choosing
where the values of {α i } are determined by the optimization problem in (19) .
Proof : See Appendix B.
Remark 1:
In the absence of secrecy constraints, the first and second derivatives of the MIMO capacity at SNR = 0 are [11] 
where l is the multiplicity of λ max (H † m H m ). Hence, the first and second derivatives are achieved by transmitting in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of H † m H m , the subspace in which the transmitter-receiver channel is the strongest. Due to the optimality of the water-filling power allocation method, power should be equally distributed in each orthogonal direction in this subspace in order for the second derivative to be achieved.
Remark 2: We see from Theorem 1 that when there are secrecy constraints, we should at low SNRs transmit in the direction in which the transmitter-receiver channel is strongest with respect to the transmitter-eavesdropper channel normalized by the ratio of the noise variances. For instance,Ċ s (0) can be achieved by beamforming in the direction in which the eigenvalue of Φ is maximized. On the other hand, if λ max (Φ) has multiplicity greater than one, the optimization problem in (19) should be solved to identify how power should be allocated to different orthogonal directions in the maximaleigenvalue eigenspace so that the second-derivativeC s (0) is
attained. This optimization problem can also be expressed as follows:
is the row vector of the optimization parameters, and Q is the l × l matrix whose components
. . , l}. From this representation, it is clear that the objective function is quadratic and constraint functions are affine. Therefore, we have a convex quadratic programming problem which can be solved efficiently using convex optimization tools [18, Section 4.4] . Note that due to the convexity of the optimization problem and the fact that the dimensionality of the problem depends on the multiplicity order l, which is less than or equal to n T , the optimization problem in (19) is in general much simpler than that in (4) . Hence, this characterization shows that finding the optimal input covariance matrix in the low-SNR regime is an easier task.
Remark 3: In general, the optimal power allocation across the orthogonal eigenvector directions associated with λ max (Φ) is neither water-filling nor beamforming in a single direction. For instance, consider parallel Gaussian channels for both transmitter-receiver and transmitter-eavesdropper links, and assume that H † m H m = diag(5, 4, 2) and H † e H e = diag(2, 1, 1) where diag() is used to denote a diagonal matrix with components provided in between the parentheses. Assume further that the noise variances are equal, i.e., N m = N e . Then, it can be easily seen that (3, 3, 1) , and hence λ max (Φ) = 3 and has a multiplicity of 2. The eigenvectors associated with λ max (Φ) are u 
Solving this simple optimization problem yields α 1 = 5/12 and α 2 = 7/12. Hence, approximately, 42% of the power is allocated to the channel for which the transmitter-receiver link has a strength of 5, and 58% is allocated for the channel with strength 4. Remark 4: When λ max (Φ) > 0 has multiplicity one, then beamforming in the direction in which λ(Φ) is maximized is optimal in the sense of achieving bothĊ s (0) andC s (0). Hence, no optimization is required. Moreover, in this case, we haveC
where u 1 is the eigenvector that corresponds to λ max (Φ). 
Therefore, we conclude from Remark 1 that when λ max (Φ) > 0, secrecy constraints diminish the first derivativeĊ s (0) at least by a factor of λ min
Nm
Ne H † e H e when compared to the case in which there are no such constraints.
Remark 6: In the case in which the transmitter has a single antenna (i.e, n T = 1), the channel matrices become column vectors. Denoting these column vectors as h m and h e , we can immediately see from the result of Theorem 1 thaṫ
, and (25)
Similarly, if each terminal has a single antenna (i.e., n T = n R = n E = 1), the results of Theorem 1 specialize tȯ
, and (27)
Above, we have mainly concentrated on the performance achieved with the optimal input covariance matrix. Suboptimal strategies expectedly lead to performance degradation. For instance, if the transmitter opts to uniformly allocate the power across the antennas, the covariance matrix becomes K x = P nT I. Hence, we have K x = 1 nT I. In this case, we can readily see from Proposition 1 that we havė
This result indicates that when we have uniform power allocation, the first derivative of the secrecy rate is proportional to the average of the eigenvalues of Φ rather than the maximum eigenvalue.
We now illustrate the theoretical results through numerical analysis. We consider a system in which all terminals have 3 antennas, i.e., n T = n R = n E = 3. Assume that the channel matrices are . Therefore, the covariance matrix that is optimal in the sense of achieving both the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity is K x = P uu † . In Fig. 1 in which secrecy rates are plotted as a function of SNR, the dashed curve shows the secrecy rates achieved when this input covariance matrix is employed. Note that this secrecy rate curve is optimally close to the secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime as it has the same first and second derivatives. Note also that for the considered model, we havė C s (0) = λ max (Φ) = 1.6298. Fig. 1 also provides secrecy rates for two suboptimal choices of K x . The dot-dashed curve plots the secrecy rates when K x = P vv † where v is the eigenvector that corresponds to λ max (H † m H m ). Hence, transmission in this case is performed in the direction in which the channel between the transmitter and legitimate receiver is strongest. Note that this strategy is optimal in the low-SNR regime if there are no secrecy considerations. However, as we also observe in the figure, it is in general suboptimal in the wiretap channel model. Even the slope at zero SNR is smaller. Indeed, the slope isİ s (0) = tr (Φ K x ) = 1.2444. In Fig. 1 , we also plot the secrecy rates (with the dotted curve) when the power is uniformly allocated across the antennas. In this case, we haveİ s (0) = 1 3 tr (Φ) = 0.18, which is about 11% ofĊ s (0). Inefficiency of uniform power allocation is further evidenced in the observation that the secrecy rates start diminishing as SNR is increased beyond 0.94, due to the fact that transmission is also possibly being conducted in the directions in which the eavesdropper's channel is strong and consequently, increasing the power improves the eavesdropper's ability to wiretap the channel. Finally, as a comparison, we plot in Fig. 1 the rates achieved in the absence of secrecy constraints when K x = P vv † with v as defined above. For this case, the first derivative of the capacity is λ max (H † m H) = 2.7676.
B. Minimum Energy per Secret Bit
In this section, we study the energy required to send information both reliably and securely. In particular, we investigate the minimum energy required to send one secret bit. Before identifying the minimum energy per secret bit, we first show that the secrecy capacity is concave in SNR.
Proposition 2: The secrecy capacity C s achieved under the average power constraint E{ x 2 } ≤ P is a concave function of SNR.
Proof: See Appendix C. The energy per secret bit normalized by the noise variance at the legitimate receiver is defined as
As mentioned before, since the secrecy capacity is a concave function of SNR, the minimum energy per secret bit is achieved as SNR → 0 and hence is given by
We can now write the following corollary to Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
Corollary 1:
The minimum bit energy attained under secrecy constraints (i.e., minimum energy per secret bit) is
Remark 7: From Remark 5, we can write for λ max (Φ) > 0 (35) given on the next page, by plugging in the expressions in (18) and (19) into that in (6):
In Fig. 2 , we plot the secrecy rates in bits/s/Hz/dimension as a function of the energy per secret bit
under the same assumptions and channel model as in Fig. 1 . We see, as predicted, that the minimum bit energy is attained in all cases λmax(Φ) = −3.71 dB. Therefore, secrecy constraints lead to an increase of 2.3 dB in the minimum energy requirements. We also note that the energy cost of secrecy increases as secrecy rates increase. Moreover, we observe that the suboptimal choices of K x induce additional energy penalties. When we have K x = P vv † where v is the eigenvector that corresponds to λ max (H † m H m ), the minimum bit energy is −2.54 dB. In the case of uniform power allocation, the minimum bit energy requirement jumps to 5.85 dB.
IV. THE IMPACT OF FADING
In this section, we assume that the channel matrices H m and H e are random matrices, whose components are stationary and ergodic random variables, modeling fading in wireless transmissions. We again assume that realizations of these matrices are perfectly known by all the terminals. As discussed in [13] , fading channel can be regarded as a set of parallel subchannels each of which corresponds to a particular fading realization. Hence, in each subchannel, the channel matrices are fixed similarly as in the channel model considered in the previous section. In [13] , Liang et al. have shown that having independent inputs for each subchannel is optimal and the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel subchannels is equal to the sum of the capacities of subchannels. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of fading channels can be be found by averaging the secrecy capacities attained for different fading realizations.
We assume that the transmitter is subject to a short-term power constraint. Hence, for each channel realization, the same amount of power is used and we have tr (K x ) ≤ P . With this assumption, the transmitter is allowed to perform power adaptation in space across the antennas, but not across time. Under such constraints, it can easily be seen from the above discussion that the average secrecy capacity in fading channels is given by
where the expectation is with respect to the joint distribution of (H m , H e ). Note that the only difference between (4) and (36) is the presence of expectation in (36). Due to this similarity, the following result can be obtained immediately as a corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 2:
The first derivative of the average secrecy capacity in (36) with respect to SNR = P nRNm at SNR = 0 isĊ
The second derivative of the average secrecy capacity at SNR = 0 is given by (38) on the next page, where 1{·} again denotes the indicator function, l is the multiplicity of λ max (Φ) > 0, and {u i } are the eigenvectors that span the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace for particular realizations of H m and H e .
Remark 9: Similarly as in the unfaded case,Ċ s (0) is achieved by always transmitting in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of the realizations of the matrix Φ. In order to achieve the second derivative, optimal values of {α i } (or equivalently the optimal power allocation across the antennas) should be identified again for each possible realization of Φ.
Remark 10: In the case in which n T = 1, the first and second derivatives of the average secrecy capacity becomė
, and
Note that the average secrecy capacity in (36) is still a concave function of SNR due to the fact that nonnegative weighted sum of concave functions is concave [18, Section 3.2.1]. Therefore, similarly as in Section III-B, we can identify the minimum energy per secret bit as follows.
Corollary 3: The minimum energy per secret bit required
in fading channels is
Remark 11: As also noted in [14] and [15] , fading has a potential to improve the low-SNR performance and hence the energy efficiency. To illustrate this, we consider the following example. Assume n T = n R = n E = 1. Consider first the unfaded Gaussian channel in which the deterministic channel coefficients are h m = h e = 1. For this case, we havė
Now, consider a Rayleigh fading environment and assume that h m and h e are independent, zero-mean, circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with variances E{|h m | 2 } = E{|h e | 2 } = 1. Then, we can easily find thaṫ
leading to Above, we have assumed that the fading coefficients h m and h e are independent. Next, we demonstrate that the gains are still observed even if the channel coefficients are correlated. We again assume that h m and h e are zero-mean, circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with E{|h m | 2 } = E{|h e | 2 } = 1. Let us denote z m = |h m | 2 and z e = |h e | 2 . Using the bivariate Rayleigh probability density function given in [19, Equation 6 .2], we can easily obtain the bivariate exponential density as
where I 0 denotes the zeroth order modified Bessel function of the first kind and ρ = . In Fig. 3 , the minimum energy per secret bit is plotted as a function of the correlation coefficient ρ. When ρ = 0 and hence the channel coefficients are independent, we 
Ne Nm+Ne = log 2 0.5 = 1.419 dB.
As the correlation increases, the minimum bit energy value increases. However, note that the bit energy values are finite unless there is full correlation. Note further that if there were no fading, we would have
(recalling the assumption that N m = N e = 1). Hence, in general, correlated fading provides improvements in secure communication as well. Above, gains in the minimum energy per secret bit, which is attained as SNR vanishes, are discussed. In general, fading is beneficial in terms of energy efficiency at nonzero SNR levels as well. This is demonstrated in Fig. 4 . In this figure, we plot the secrecy capacity when n T = 1, n R = 5, and n E = 3. We consider two scenarios: no fading and i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. In the case in which there is no fading, we assume that the channel coefficients are all equal to 1. In the fading scenario, we assume that the channel vectors h m and h e consist of independent and identically distributed, zero-mean Gaussian components each with unit variance, i.e., E{|h m,i | 2 } = 1 and E{|h e,i | 2 } = 1 for all i. We additionally assume that h m and h e are independent of each other. Note that under these assumptions, h m 2 and h e 2 are independent chi-square random variables with 2n R and 2n E degrees of freedom, respectively. In Fig. 4 , we observe that better performance is achieved in the presence of fading. Indeed, energy gains tend to increase at higher values of secrecy capacity. For instance, when C s = 0.14 bits/s/Hz/dimension, we have a gain of approximately 8 dB in
. Note that this is a substantial improvement in energy efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the MIMO secrecy capacity in the low-SNR regime. In particular, by identifying the first and second derivatives of the secrecy capacity at SNR = 0, we have shown that it is optimal at low SNRs to transmit in the maximal-eigenvalue eigenspace of the matrix
Hence, the optimal transmission strategy in this regime is to transmit the confidential information in the directions in which the transmitter-receiver channel is strongest with respect to the transmitter-eavesdropper channel. We have noted that beamforming in a single direction is optimal when the maximum eigenvalue of Φ, λ max (Φ), has multiplicity one. If, on the other hand, multiple orthogonal eigenvectors are associated with λ max (Φ), we have identified a convex optimization problem whose solution yields how the power should be allocated to transmission in these directions in order to attain both the first and second derivatives at SNR = 0.
In order to analyze the energy efficiency, we have determined the minimum bit energy required for secure and reliable communications in the presence of an eavesdropper. We have shown that secrecy in general increases the bit energy requirements. We have also noted that the suboptimal choices of transmission strategies can incur additional energy penalties. Numerical results are provided to illustrate the theoretical findings. Following the analysis for the fixed channel, we have investigated the low-SNR secrecy capacity in the presence of fading. We have demonstrated the benefits of fading in terms of energy efficiency.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The secrecy rate is expressed as
Defining the normalized input covariance matrix as K x = 1 P K x 6 , we can rewrite the secrecy rate as
where we have SNR = P nRNm . As also noted in [11] , it can be easily shown that
Then, using (45), we immediately havė
In order to obtain the second derivative, we can apply (46) to the positive part of the secrecy rate to obtain
Note that the above expression is the second derivative of the positive part of the secrecy rate, and hence applies only when the secrecy rate is positive. If the secrecy rate is zero, the second derivative is also zero, and hence we have the indicator function in the final expression in (11) .
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We first note that the input covariance matrix K x = E{xx † } is by definition a positive semidefinite Hermitian matrix. As a 6 As shown in more detail in the proof of Theorem 1, we implicitly assume that the nonzero eigenvalues of Kx scale linearly with P . Any eigenvalues that diminish to zero faster than P can already be assumed to be zero to start with for the purposes of the low-SNR analysis because eigenvalues that scale with P will determine the low-SNR behavior. If all eigenvalues vanish faster than P (e.g., scale as P 1+a for some a > 0), then the first derivative of the secrecy rate at SNR = 0 is zero, showing the inefficiency of such power allocation strategies Hermitian matrix, K x can be written as [17, 
SinceC s (0) is equal to the expression in (63) when λ max (Φ) > 0 and is zero otherwise, the final expression in (19) is obtained by multiplying the formula in (63) with the indicator function 1{λ max (Φ) > 0}.
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: Concavity can be easily shown using the timesharing argument. Assume that at power level P 1 and signalto-noise ratio SNR 1 , the optimal input is x 1 , which satisfies E{ x 1 2 } ≤ P 1 , and the secrecy capacity is C s (SNR 1 ). Similarly, for P 2 and SNR 2 , the optimal input is x 2 , which satisfies E{ x 2 2 } ≤ P 2 , and the secrecy capacity is C s (SNR 2 ). Now, we assume that the transmitter performs time-sharing by transmitting at two different power levels using x 1 and x 2 . More specifically, in θ fraction of the time, the transmitter uses the input x 1 , transmits at most at P 1 , and achieves the secrecy rate C s (SNR 1 ). In the remaining (1 − θ) fraction of the time, the transmitter employs x 2 , transmits at most at P 2 , and achieves the secrecy rate C s (SNR 2 ). Hence, this scheme overall achieves the average secrecy rate of
by transmitting at the level θE{ x 1 2 } + (1 − θ)E{ x 2 2 } ≤ P θ = θP 1 + (1 − θ)P 2 . The average signal-to-noise ratio is SNR θ = θSNR 1 + (1 − θ)SNR 2 . Therefore, the secrecy rate in (64) is an achievable secrecy rate at SNR θ . Since the secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable secrecy rate, the secrecy capacity at SNR θ is larger than that in (64), i.e.,
showing the concavity. We further note that the concavity can also be shown using the following facts. As also discussed in [10] , MIMO secrecy capacity is obtained by proving in the converse argument that the considered upper bound is tight and 
where D is the set of joint conditional density functions p(y r , y e |x) that satisfy p(y r |x) = p(y r |x) and p(y e |x) = p(y e |x). Note that for fixed channel distributions, the mutual information I(x; y r |y e ) is a concave function of the input distribution p(x). Since the pointwise infimum of a set of concave functions is concave [18] , f (p(x)) = min p(y r ,y e |x)∈D I(x; y r |y e ) is also a concave function of p(x). Concavity of the functional f and the fact that maximization is over input distributions satisfying E{ x 2 } ≤ P lead to the concavity of the secrecy capacity with respect to SNR.
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